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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 13-4586 
__________ 
 
MARCIA W. WILLIAMS, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-12-cv-05719) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 June 24, 2014 
 
BEFORE:  McKEE, Chief Judge, and FUENTES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion Filed:  September 11, 2014) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Marcia W. Williams appeals the denial of her claim for disability benefits.  She 
argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made a number of mistakes that the 
District Court did not properly review.  We will affirm the District Court’s decision.   
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 This opinion does not have any precedential value.  Therefore, our discussion of 
the case is limited to covering only what is necessary to explain our decision to the 
parties.  Like the District Court, we review the ALJ’s decision to determine if it is 
supported by substantial evidence.  Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Security 
Administration, 220 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 Williams’ 2009 claim of disability is grounded in her complaint that problems 
primarily with her back are so severe that she is not able to work.  The District Court 
decided that the ALJ was right when he ruled that Williams’ statements about the severity 
of her symptoms were not credible, and that the rest of the record did not prove that she 
meets the definition of disabled under the Social Security Act.  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1).  
Williams disagrees, pointing to evidence that, she says, both the ALJ and the District 
Court ignored, misunderstood or used unfairly.  We will discuss each issue separately.   
     The ALJ agrees with Williams that she has some health problems.  Specifically, 
he found that she had severe impairments from lumbar spine degenerative disease, 
thoracic spine degenerative disease, and carpal tunnel syndrome.  However, in her 
application for benefits, Williams said that she could not do any work because severe 
pain radiates from her back to her legs and left arm, and this is where her claim unravels.1   
 Williams says that she cannot sit or stand for longer than fifteen minutes, she must 
lie down a lot each day, she cannot lift more than five pounds and cannot sleep.  Yet, 
many doctors, including Williams’ own treating doctor, examined her after she filed her 
                                              
1 Though the focus of the claim is upon her back, Williams also says that the ALJ ignored 
her carpal tunnel syndrome.  We conclude that the ALJ properly ruled that the record she 
developed did not provide enough evidence that the carpel tunnel syndrome, either alone 
or considered with the other medical issues, prevents her from doing any work.   
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disability claim and could not find evidence that her back was creating these problems.  
These doctors consistently reported that Williams had high motor strength in her arms 
and legs, good coordination, normal range of movement, and generally normal results in 
her neck, respiratory, cardiovascular, abdomen, musculoskeletal, extremeties, and 
psychiatric examinations.  During office visits, doctors mostly reported that she walked 
and moved normally.  The diagnostic tests were also consistent with what the doctors 
observed:  there was evidence only of mild degenerative changes to her spine.  Finally, 
Williams reported that she was able to take care of herself and a foster child, and was 
able to do normal activities of daily living.  All of this did not line up with her 
complaints. 
 The ALJ had some other concerns.  When the doctors ruled out her spinal 
problems as the source of her severe pain, and suggested she do more tests to explore 
other potential causes, Williams generally did not follow up to schedule these tests.  The 
ALJ appropriately questioned whether this was a reasonable thing to do for someone 
reporting such pain.  He also pointed to other parts of the record that would cause anyone 
to doubt her credibility.  She said (while receiving unemployment benefits) that she was 
able to work and looking for work, but said at the same time on her disability claim that 
her back problems prevented her from working.  Also, the Social Security Administration 
flagged her claim and conducted a fraud investigation.    
 Williams argues that the ALJ used this evidence unfairly.  We disagree.  Although 
these things factored into his credibility determination, the ALJ based his decision on far 
more than just these issues.  He pointed out contradictions between what Williams’ said 
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about her limitations and her medical record and conduct.  The ALJ was on solid ground 
when he ruled that he could not rely on Williams’ reports about the level of her pain and 
limitations.  This finding is entitled to our deference.   
 She also says that the rest of the record supports her claim.  However, her proof is 
little more than general evidence of a mild back problem, and a singular note here and 
there that says she had pain or had trouble moving.  There is no consistent line of 
evidence that supports her claim of disabling pain coming from her back.  Finally, she 
wants us to rely on a report written by her chiropractor, who did no more than repeat 
Williams’ complaints without any medical testing to support it.  This evidence is, at best, 
weak, falling far short of her burden to prove that she meets legal definition of disabled.2   
 Williams makes a number of other claims:  the ALJ ignored evidence that she met 
a listed impairment;  his residual functional capacity assessment is not supported with 
enough evidence; his definition of “light work” is wrong; and, the hypothetical the ALJ 
gave to the vocational expert was not accurate.  For all of these issues, we find ourselves 
mostly repeating our conclusion that the ALJ did a thorough review of the record.  He 
showed a proper understanding of Williams’ impairments before reaching conclusions 
about how they impacted her ability to work.  Specifically, we cannot find any problems 
with his conclusion that Williams did not meet a listed impairment.  The record showed 
no more than minor disc degeneration and there was no evidence that it (and carpal 
                                              
2 Williams also says that the ALJ did not look at the whole record because he used 
“circular logic” by referring to his own document—the Residual Functional Capacity 
assessment—to rule on her credibility.  Williams misinterprets what the ALJ said.  As we 
already made clear, the ALJ had a good understanding of the whole record.     
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tunnel syndrome) made her unable to work.  We are also convinced that the ALJ’s 
residual functional capacity assessment is firmly based in substantial evidence and 
accurately reflects the symptoms that the ALJ found credible.3  On this record, he 
properly decided that she could perform a subset of tasks that fell under the definition of 
light work and he described these limitations clearly.  We did not see any errors here.  
Likewise, the hypothetical the ALJ gave to the vocational expert accurately described 
Williams’ condition.  Therefore, the vocational experts’ testimony was reliable.  None of 
these arguments convinced us that the District Court and the ALJ were wrong.      
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.   
                                              
3 Williams vaguely says that a medical expert who testified was not able to review the 
whole record.  However, Williams fails to explain what was missing, why she did not 
object at the time it happened, and how it prejudiced her. 
